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In this paper we study the quantitative macroeconomic effects of public education spending in 
USA for the post-war period. Using comparable measures of human and physical capital, 
from Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, 1992a,b), we calibrate a standard dynamic general 
equilibrium model where human capital is the engine of long-run endogenous growth and 
government education spending is justified by externalities in human capital. Our base 
calibration, based on moderate sized human capital externalities, suggests that public 
spending on education is both growth and welfare promoting. However, given that public 
education spending crowds-out private consumption, the welfare maximising size of the 
government is less than the growth maximising one. Our results further suggest that welfare 
gains, as high as four percent of consumption, are obtainable if the composition of public 
spending can be altered in favour of education spending relative to the other components of 
total government spending. 
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the Queens University Belfast for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. “If ideas are the engine of growth and if an excess of social over private
returns in an essential feature of the production of ideas, then we want to go
out of our way to introduce external eﬀects into growth theory, not to try to
do without them”. [Lucas 2002]
1 Introduction
The path-breaking work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), stressing the
roles of knowledge and human capital accumulation, has led to an enormous
body of theoretical1 and empirical2 literature attempting to better under-
stand the determinants of endogenous growth. The same literatures have
also emphasized the central role played by externalities associated with hu-
man capital accumulation.3 The importance of externalities in this context
is highlighted by Lucas (2002), who states that “the existence of important
external eﬀects of investment in human capital — in knowledge — has long
been viewed as an evident and important aspect of reality”.
Despite the obvious need, from a policy perspective, to understand the
quantitative links between externalities, human capital accumulation and
growth, there has been surprisingly little empirical work at the aggregate
level. Indeed, we are only aware of one study which attempts to directly
estimate human capital externalities in a growth context (see Gong, Greiner
and Semmler (2004)) and several others which examine the link between
externalities and the level of aggregate output (see, e.g. Mamuneas et al.
(2001) and Heckman and Klenow (1997)).4
In the presence of human capital externalities, a clear case for ﬁscal policy
intervention can be made and in particular a role for government education
1See, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Aghion and Howitt (1999) for references
as well as Romer (1990) for an excellent review paper.
2Empirical studies on the role of human capital based on reduced-form cross-sectional
country or panel regressions, unequivocally ﬁnd a signiﬁcant link between average years
of schooling and growth (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Barro (2001, 1991),
de la Fuente and Domenech (2001)). Another set of studies estimates the steady-state
relationship between growth and human capital implied by the solution of extended Solow
or Lucas-type models also concludes that human capital contributes either directly or
indirectly (via total factor productivity) to growth, see, e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Bils and Klenow, 2000 and Temple (2001).
3Klenow and Rodrigues-Clare (2005) provide a very good review of these studies and
include discussion of externalities associated with the accumulation of human capital,
organizational capital, the introduction of new goods, or some combination of these.
4There has however been much more work at the sub-aggregate level (see the review
paper by Davies (2003) for references).
2policy. Despite rich and growing theoretical5 and empirical6 literatures on
the relationship between ﬁscal policy and economic growth, we are again not
aware of any estimation or calibration research which explores the empirical
links between education spending policy, human capital externalities and
growth.
Given the potential beneﬁts from policy and the lack of quantitative re-
search to date, in this paper we calibrate, solve and conduct policy analysis
using a standard endogenous growth model. In the spirit of Lucas’s (2002)
observations stated above, the model’s engine of long-term growth is human
capital accumulation in the presence of externalities. More speciﬁcally, fol-
lowing Tamura (1991) we specify a model which allows for positive external-
ities associated with the stock of aggregate human capital. This externality
in turn justiﬁes the provision of public education which acts to directly aﬀect
the accumulation of embodied human capital.
Our calibration proﬁts signiﬁcantly from having access to a dataset which
includes consistent measures for human and physical capital (see, e.g. Jor-
genson and Fraumeni (1989)). In contrast to the relevant empirical studies
referred to above, this data allows us to correctly distinguish between inputs
to and output from the human capital production function.7 Accordingly,
while no consensus has yet emerged on the precise quantitative role of ex-
ternalities from the empirical micro and macro studies, our contribution is
to examine the eﬀects of a range of externalities on aggregate growth and
welfare based on a careful calibration using a unique dataset.
To be in a position to realistically assess the eﬀects of public education
spending on growth, we assume that this spending is ﬁnanced by a distor-
tionary tax on income. Hence, the growth eﬀects of this spending will not
be monotonic. We then use the calibrated model to shed light on the crit-
ical issues pertaining to the sign and magnitude of ﬁscal policy on long-run
growth, lifetime welfare as well as the cyclical path of the economy along the
transition path.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, based on moderate sized human
5One of the most popular models is Barro (1990) in which government productive
expenditure, ﬁnanced by distorting tax rates, is the engine of long-term growth. There
are numerous extensions of this model in the literature (see e.g., Malley et al. (2007),
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (2004) ch. 4, Park and Philippopoulos, (2004, 2003), Baier and
Glomm (2001), Glomm and Ravikumar, (1994, 1997), and Turnovsky and Fischer (1995).
6The empirical evidence on the relationship between ﬁscal policy and growth is vast
and the results so far have been mixed (see e.g., Mueller (2003, ch. 22), Gemmel and
Kneller (2001) and Tanzi and Zee (1997), for surveys of this literature).
7Given the lack of comparable cross-country human capital data, other empirical work
generally resorts to the use of measures of school enrolment ratios or years of schooling as
general proxies of labor quality or human capital.
3capital externalities, our results suggests that public spending on education
is both growth and welfare promoting. However, given that pubic education
spending crowds-out private consumption, the welfare maximising size of the
government is less than the growth maximising one. Second, we ﬁnd that
substantial welfare gains are obtainable if the composition of public spending
can be altered in favour of education spending relative to the other compo-
nents of total government spending. These welfare gains, calculated using
the solution to the second-order approximation of the model, amount to 4-
percent of consumption and correspond to an education spending share of
8.5%. Third, the positive welfare eﬀects of education spending work through
human capital externalities. In particular, in the presence of higher exter-
nalities, the model predicts that the welfare maximizing education spending
is higher. Intuitively, a larger gap between private and social returns under
higher externalities makes government intervention more beneﬁcial. Finally,
we ﬁnd that a positive education spending shock generates a non-monotonic
reaction in the growth rate and other key economic variables, so that after
an initial boom there is a decrease in the growth rate below its steady-state
value. The quantitative eﬀects of discretionary ﬁscal policy of this form are
not trivial as they are similar in magnitude to those of a standard TFP shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data and calibration. Section 4
contains the results and Section 5 the conclusions. Finally, the Appendices
present further information on the steady-state, the second-order welfare
function and second-order impulse response functions.
2 The Theoretical Model
In this section, building on Lucas’s (1990) model of human capital, we solve
for the optimal decisions of households and ﬁrms when the engine of long-
term growth is human capital accumulation in the presence of aggregate
externalities. We choose this model because it is well known and its conclu-
sions are rather robust (see, e.g. Stokey and Rebelo (1995) for a quantitative
comparison of some important DSGE models of human capital).
To conduct our analysis, we add several elements to the Lucas (1990)
setup. These include the two main types of productive government spending
(i.e. government expenditure on infrastructure and public education) and the
externalities generated by the per capita human capital stock of the society.
The role of the latter has been emphasized by amongst others Lucas (1988)
and Tamura (1991) and can justify the provision of public education spending
in the model. In our setup, government infrastructure acts as a public good
4that enhances the productivity of private ﬁrms when they produce output,
while public education acts as a public good that enhances the productivity
of households’ private education choices.
The general equilibrium solution of the model consists of a system of
dynamic relations jointly specifying the paths of output, consumption, pri-
vate and public physical capital, human capital growth and the fractions of
time allocated to work and education. To obtain these paths we solve the
second-order approximation of our model’s equilibrium conditions around
the deterministic steady-state (see, e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)).
In contrast to solutions which impose certainty equivalence, the solution of
the second-order system allows us to take account of the uncertainty agents
face when making decisions. As pointed out by e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004) and Kim and Kim (2003), the second-order approximation to
the model’s policy function helps to avoid potential spurious welfare rankings
which may arise under certainty equivalence.
2.1 Households
The model is populated by a large number of identical households indexed
by the subscript h and identical ﬁrms indexed by the subscript f,w h e r e
h,f =1 ,2,...,N t. The population size, Nt, evolves at a constant rate n ≥ 1,
so that Nt+1 = nNt,w h e r eN0 is given. Each household’s preferences are








where E0 is the conditional expectations operator; Ch
t is consumption of
household h at time t;a n d0 <β<1 is the subjective rate of time preference.
The instantaneous utility function is increasing, concave and satisﬁes the








where, 1/σ (σ>1) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption in adjacent periods.
Each household saves in the form of investment, I
p,h
t and receives interest
income, rtK
p,h
t ,w h e r ert is the return to private capital and K
p,h
t (the p su-
perscript refers to private agents) is the beginning-of-period private capital
stock. Each household also has one unit of time endowment in each period
5t, which it allocates to work, uh
t and education, eh
t,s ot h a tuh
t + eh
t =1 8.A
household with a stock of human capital, Hh
t receives labour income, wtuh
tHh
t ,
where wt i st h ew a g er a t ea n duh
tHh
t is eﬀective labour. Finally, each house-
hold receives dividends paid by ﬁrms, Πh
t. Accordingly, the budget constraint




















where 0 <τ t < 1 is the distortionary income tax rate and G
o
t is an average
(per household) lump-sum tax/subsidy.9

























¢1−θ1 e Bt (5)
where, 0 ≤ δ
p,δ
h ≤ 1 are constant depreciation rates on private physical
and human capital respectively. The second expression on the r.h.s. of (5),
consisting of three multiplicative terms, can be interpreted as the quantity of
“new” human capital created at time period t. This expression is comprised






is h0s eﬀective human capital; (ii) Ht
is the average (per household) human capital stock in the economy; (iii) e Bt ≡
B (ge
t)
θ2 represents human capital productivity, where B>0 is a constant
scale parameter and ge
t is average (per household) public education expressed
in eﬃciency units (see below); (iv) the parameters 0 <θ 1,(1 − θ1),θ 2 < 1
capture the productivity of household human capital, the aggregate human
capital externality and public education spending respectively.
The assumption that individual human capital accumulation is an in-
creasing function of the per capita level of economy-wide human capital en-
capsulates the idea that the existing know-how of the economy provides an
external positive eﬀect. Equivalently it can be thought of as a learning-
by-doing eﬀect as discussed in Romer (1986). Examples of other papers
which use the per capita level of aggregate human capital in either the goods
or human capital production functions include Lucas (1988), Azariadis and
Drazen, (1990) and Tamura (1991). Al s on o t et h a tt h er o l ep l a y e db yt h e
8Following the human capital literature, which includes education as a choice variable,
we do not endogenize leisure choice since this generally leads to multiple long-run equilibria
(see e.g. Ortigueira, 1998, who also provides relevant references). Stokey and Rebelo
(1995) also discuss the implications of elastic labour supply in growth models with human
capital.
9T h er o l ep l a y e db yG
o
t will be explained below in subsection 2.3.
6per household public education share, ge
t,i n(5) is consistent with the goal
of public education policy as well as theoretical work (see e.g. Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992), Blankenau and Simpson (2004), Su (2004) and Blanke-
nau (2005)).10 Finally note that, the parameter restrictions employed in (5)
imply increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the social level.11
Households act competitively by taking prices, policy variables and aggre-










t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), (5), the time constraint uh
t +eh
t =




Substituting (4) into (3) for I
p,h
t and using the time constraint for uh
t,w e












and states that the shadow price associated with (3), Λh
t,i se q u a lt ot h e
marginal value of consumption at time t.
The Euler-relation for private physical capital, K
p,h





t+1 [1 − δ
p +( 1− τt+1)rt+1] (7)
and reveals that the marginal cost of forgone consumption at time t is equal
to the expected marginal beneﬁt of discounted t +1net (of tax) returns
derived from investing in one unit of physical capital at time t.
The static optimality condition for time spent on education, eh




















and says that the shadow price associated with (5), Ψh
t,i se q u a lt ot h e
marginal value of education at time t.































10Blankenau (2005, pp. 493-4) also has a good discussion of the eﬀects of public educa-
tion on students’ achievement.
11Lucas (1988) and Benhabib and Perli (1994) are examples of other studies which
employ the IRS assumption in either or both the physical and human capital production
functions.
7and expresses that the marginal cost of forgone labour income at time t is
equal to the marginal beneﬁt of discounted net (of tax) t +1returns to
working plus the marginal t +1returns to investing in one unit of human
capital at time t.
















maintain and state that the discounted value of a household’s physical and
human assets must approach zero in the limit. Otherwise, utility could be
increased by higher consumption.
2.2 Firms
To produce its homogenous ﬁnal product, Y
f
t ,e a c hﬁrm, f, chooses private
physical capital, K
p,f




t , and takes advantage of av-
erage (per ﬁrm) public infrastructure as a share of average (per ﬁrm) human
capital, k
g
t, expressed in eﬃciency units (see below) Thus, the production
function of each ﬁrm is:
Y
f













where e At ≡ At (k
g
t)
α2; At represents the level of Hick neutral neutral tech-
nology available to all ﬁrms, 0 <α 1,(1 − α1),α 2 < 1 are the productivity
of private capital and labour and public capital respectively. Following, e.g.
Baxter and King (1993), the parameter restrictions employed in (12) imply
increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the social level.
Firms act competitively by taking prices, policy variables and aggregate


















t .( 1 3 )
The resulting familiar ﬁrst-order conditions state that the ﬁrm will hire
labour until the marginal product of eﬀective labour is equal to the wage
rate, wt, and will rent capital until the marginal product of physical capital
















= rt.( 1 5 )
2.3 Government
Total government investment, Gi
t, total expenditure on public education, Ge
t
and all other types of public spending, Go

























where only three of the four policy instruments can be exogenously set.12
When we solve the model, we will choose the tax rate to be the endogenous
or residually determined policy instrument so that the eﬀects of increases in
government spending on education and infrastructure can be credibly as-
sessed. The inclusion of Go
t will make the residually determined value of the
tax rate correspond to the rate which exists in the data. This will allow for
a realistic assessment of the trade-oﬀs between increased spending on public
goods versus increased distortions due to higher tax rates.
Finally, total government investment, Gi
t, is used to augment the stock of









where 0 ≤ δ
g ≤ 1 is a constant depreciation rate on public physical capital.
2.4 Stationary decentralized competitive equilibrium

























t=0,p r i c e s{rt,w t}
∞
t=0 and the tax rate {τt}
∞
t=0
such that (i) households maximize utility; (ii) ﬁr m sm a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts; (iii) all
markets clear; (iv) the government budget constraint as well as the motion
of public capital are satisﬁe di ne a c ht i m ep e r i o d .N o t et h a tm a r k e tc l e a r i n g
values will be denoted without the superscripts h, f.
Since human capital is the engine of long-run endogenous growth, we
transform variables to make them stationary. Following the literature (see,
12In other words, we use a balanced budget without debt. Ignoring debt is not critical
here since in this class of model, public ﬁnance variables do not aﬀect the real allocation
of the economy.
9e.g. Lucas 1990), we ﬁrst deﬁne per capita quantities for any variable X as









t). We next express
these quantities as shares of per capita human capital, e.g. xt ≡ Xt/Ht.
Finally, the gross human capital growth rate is deﬁned as γt ≡ Ht+1/Ht.
Using this notation, substituting out prices {rt,w t}
∞
t=0 and substituting
for Λt and Λt+1 in (8) and (9) respectively, we obtain the following per capita
stationary DCE:
yt = At (k
p
t)







t+1 − (1 − δ
p)k
p





































−σ (1 − α1)(1− τt)yt



























t = τtyt (18i)
where λt and ψt are the transformed shadow prices associated with (3) and
(5) respectively in the household’s problem.13
Therefore, the stationary DCE is summarized by the above system of nine











t=0 w h o s em o t i o ni sd e ﬁned below.
13Note that λt = Λt/H
−σ
t and ψt = Ψt/H
−σ
t where h-superscripts are omitted in a
symmetric equilibrium.
102.5 Processes for the ﬁscal instruments and technology
We next specify the processes governing the evolution of public spending
i t e m sa ss h a r e so fo u t p u t .T h i sﬁrst requires that each spending instrument,




t ≡ e g
j
tyt (19)



































where g ≡ ge + gi + go; e gt ≡ e ge
t + e gi
t + e go
t; 0 <ρ e < 1 is the autoregressive
parameter and εe
t an iid random shock to public education with a zero mean
and constant standard deviation, σe.
In order to assess the eﬀects of public education spending, we specify an
AR(1) process in (22) where the innovations εe
t represent discretionary edu-
cation spending changes. Consistent with the US data, the policy rules (20)
and (21) imply that the government investment and other government spend-
ing as shares of output are constant fractions of total government spending










in the data. In this state (called policy regime A) the composition
of public expenditure remains constant when the government spending as
a share of output changes. We will also examine the policy scenario where
the government investment and other government spending as shares of out-
put do not react to changes in government education spending. In this case
they are instead ﬁxed at a speciﬁc share which can be obtained by setting
e gt = g in policy rules (20) and (21)). In this state (called policy regime B),
the composition of government spending changes when e ge
t changes, but the
shares of government investment and other government spending spending
over output remain constant.








11where A>0 is a constant, 0 <ρ a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
εa
t ∼ iid(0,σ2
a) are the random shocks to productivity.
3 Data and Calibration
3.1 Data
To calibrate the model, we ﬁrst require data for the endogenous variables
as shares of human capital. Thus it is important to obtain a measure of
human capital that is comparable to monetary valued quantities such as
consumption, income, public and private capital and government spending.
To obtain this, we use data from Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, 1992a,b)
on human and physical capital.14 These measures are reported in billions of
constant 1982 dollars for 1949-1984.
The basic idea used in the construction of this dataset is that the out-
put of the education sector is considered as investment in human capital.
In this context, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992a) note: “investment in hu-
man beings, like investment in tangible form of capital such as buildings
and industrial equipment, generates a stream of future beneﬁts. Education
is regarded as an investment in human capital, since beneﬁts accrue to an
educated individual over a lifetime of activities”. Jorgenson and Fraumeni
(1989) also note that “in order to construct comparable measures of invest-
ment in human and nonhuman capital, we deﬁne human capital in terms of
lifetime labor incomes for all individuals in the US population. Lifetime labor
incomes correspond to asset values for investment goods used in accounting
for physical or nonhuman capital”.
The additional (annual) data required for calibration are obtained from
the following sources: (i) Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA accounts); (ii)
OECD (Economic Outlook database); (iii) US Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS); and (iv) ECFIN Eﬀective Average Tax Base (see
Martinez-Mongay, 2000).
14Generally empirical studies use measures of school enrolment ratios or years of school-
ing as general proxies of labor quality or human capital. However, in our setup, these
proxies are measures of the input to the production function of human capital (time spent
on education) and not of the output of this activity, new human capital.
123.2 Calibration
The numeric values for the model’s parameters are reported in Table 1. To
calibrate the model, we work as follows.15 W es e tt h ev a l u eo f(1 − α1) equal
to labor’s share in income (i.e. 0.578) using compensation of employees data
from the OECD Economic Outlook. This ﬁgure is similar to others used in
the literature, see e.g. King and Rebelo (1988) and Lansing (1998). Given
labour’s share, capital’s share, α1, is then determined residually. Following
e.g. Baxter and King (1993), the exponent of public infrastructure in the
production function α2 is equal to the government investment share in GDP,
i.e. 0.041, obtained from the NIPA accounts.16
Table 1: Parameter Values (base calibration)
parameter value deﬁnition
A>0 0.077 technological progress in goods production
B>0 0.464 technological progress in human capital production
0 <α 1 < 1 0.422 productivity of private capital
0 < 1 − α1 < 1 0.578 productivity of eﬀective labor
0 <α 2 < 1 0.041 productivity of public capital
0 <β<1 0.964 rate of time preference
n ≥ 1 1.016 population growth
0 ≤ δ
p ≤ 1 0.049 depreciation rate on private capital
0 ≤ δ
h ≤ 1 0.018 depreciation rate on human capital
0 ≤ δ
g ≤ 1 0.049 depreciation rate on public capital
0 < e ge < 1 0.055 public education spending share of output
0 < e gi < 1 0.041 public investment spending share of output
0 < e go < 1 0.114 other public investment spending share of output
0 <g e/g < 1 0.262 public education spending as a share of total g
0 <g i/g < 1 0.195 public investment spending as a share of total g
0 <g o/g < 1 0.543 other public spending as a share of total g
σ>1 2.000 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1 0.600 productivity of household human capital
0 ≤ 1 − θ1 ≤ 1 0.400 productivity of aggregate human capital
0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1 0.200 productivity of public education spending
0 <τ<1 0.210 eﬀective direct tax rate
The discount rate, 1/β is equal to 1 plus the ex-post real interest rate,
15Note that an extensive sensitivity analysis of the calibration and its eﬀects on the
steady-state solution for the growth rate of output is provided in the Appendices.
16We calculate government investment net of education investment which is included in
our Ge measure.
13where the interest rate data is from the OECD Economic Outlook. This
implies a value 0.964 for β. Again this ﬁgure is similar to other US studies,
see e.g. King and Rebelo (1999), Lansing (1998) and Perli and Sakellaris
(1998). The population gross growth rate n is set equal to the post war
labor force growth rate, 1.016, obtained by using data from Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The depreciation rates for physical, δ
p,a n dh u m a nc a p i t a l ,δ
h,a r e
calculated by Jorgenson and Fraumeni to be, on average, 0.049 and 0.0178,
respectively. We also set the depreciation rate for public capital, δ
g,e q u a lt o
that of private capital.
We also require constants for government education, investment and other
spending as shares of output. The education and investment spending ratios
are ﬁx e da ts a m p l ea v e r a g e su s i n gN I P Ad a t at oe ge =0 .055, e gi =0 .041.
We set other government spending, Go
t, in the government budget equation
(16) so that the long-run solution for the tax rate gives 0.21. This value
corresponds to the eﬀective income tax reported in the ECFIN dataset.17.
This implies that e go =( 0 .21 − 0.055 − 0.041). Finally the constants for the
components of public spending to total public spending are also implied by
the data, e.g. gi/g =0.195, go/g =0.543, and ge/g ≡ 1−gi/g −go/g =0.262.
We next move on to the parameters of the production function of human









θ2 in equation (9)
is essentially the production function for the creation of new human capital,
or what Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992) call investment in human capital.
The results for the base model are obtained by using the value for the human
capital externality calibrated by Lucas (1988). Hence, we start by setting
(1 − θ1)=0 .4. Conditional on this value, the productivity of household hu-
man capital, θ1, is determined residually and we then calibrate θ2 =0 .2 to
ensure that the long-run gross growth rate of output per labour input is equal
to 1.02. This value corresponds to the USA per labour input growth rate for
1949-1984 using GDP data from the NIPA accounts and labour data from
Bureau of Labor Statistics. As there is no conclusive evidence on the size of
human capital externalities, we will also examine the case of a much lower
externality parameter, i.e. (1 − θ1)=0 .05, as calibrated by Tamura (1991).
We ﬁnally require model consistent values for the scale parameters A and
B. These are obtained by solving equations (5) and (12) u s i n gd a t aa v e r a g e s
and long-run values for the variables y, k, kg, e, γ and ge,a sw e l la st h e
calibrated parameters α1, α2, θ1, θ2, n,a n dδ
h.18
17We calculate this as the weighted average of the eﬀective tax rates on (gross) capital
income and labor income, where the weights are capital’s and labor’s shares in income.
18F o rt h i se x e r c i s ew eo b t a i nm o d e lc o n s i s t e n ty and kg.I np a r t i c u l a r ,kg is obtained
from equation (18d),w h i l ey is obtained from equation (18b),u s i n gN I P Ad a t af o rgi (less
education investment) and c. As a dataset for the share of time individuals spend on
144R e s u l t s
In this section, using the solution of the second-order approximation of the
model around the deterministic steady-state set out in the Appendix, we ﬁrst
examine the general equilibrium eﬀects on steady-state growth and lifetime
utility of increasing the public education spending share in the presence of
both moderate and low human capital externalities. We then examine the
transition paths to the steady-state when temporary shocks are applied to
the innovations of the exogenous processes driving the public education and
total factor productivity.19
4.1 Growth and welfare
The relationship between government size and economic growth is not monotonic.
On one hand, governments provide growth promoting public goods and ser-
vices and on the other, this provision requires taxes and distorts incentives.
T h e r ei st h u sat r a d e - o ﬀ being reﬂected in an inverted-U curve (or a Laﬀer
curve) between government size and economic growth (see, e.g. Barro 1990).
After a critically large size, the costs of a larger public sector eventually
outweigh the beneﬁts. From a public policy perspective it is useful to have
a handle on the magnitudes associated with the growth maximizing size of
public education spending and also whether this is welfare maximizing. We
therefore ﬁrst calculate the steady-state growth rate associated with a range
of shares of public education spending in GDP, for both policy regimes dis-
cussed in subsection 2.5.
For example, in Figure 1, subplot (1,1), where (1,1) refers to row and
column numbers respectively, we derive the Laﬀer curve for the steady-state
growth rate implied by our model under policy regime A and in subplot (1,2)
we derive the Laﬀer curve under policy regime B. Since an empirical con-
sensus has not yet emerged on the exact size of human capital externalities,
(1−θ1), Figure 1 presents two graphs per subplot using range end-points for
(1−θ1) based on Lucas (1988) and Tamura (1991), e.g. 0.4 (solid blue line)
and 0.05 (red line with a + marker) respectively.
We next derive the welfare maximizing size of government education
spending (and the implied welfare maximizing size of the government as
education as opposed to working is not available, we obtain a proxy for e to calibrate B.
This is achieved by assuming that e is the ratio of 16 years spent on average on education
over 62 minus 6 years available on average for work or education.
19We have written extensive Matlab code to conduct this analysis and make use of the
Matlab functions made available by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) to solve and simulate
the second-order approximation of the model.
15Figure 1: Effects of public education spending on steady-state growth and lifetime welfare







































































































































(1-θ1)=0.4measured by total government spending as a share of output, τ), where wel-
fare is deﬁned as the discounted sum of lifetime utility (see eq. (1)). To this
end, we ﬁrst undertake a second-order approximation of the within period
utility function around the steady-state of the model (both deﬁn e di nt h e
Appendix). We then evaluate lifetime welfare for varying shares of public
education spending (kept ﬂat over time) using the solution(s) of the sec-
ond order approximation to the stationary equilibrium laws of motion of the
model which include equations (18a − 22).
The welfare curves in Figure 1 are shown in subplots (2,1) and (2,2) for
policy regimes A and B respectively. There are, again, two graphs per sub-
plot for (1 − θ1) equal to 0.4 (solid blue line) and 0.05 (red line with a +
marker) respectively. Finally, working as in e.g. Lucas (1990) we compute
the welfare gains or losses associated with moving from the ”base calibra-
tion” policy regime A to B. Recall that regime A is where the government
increases productive and unproductive spending proportionately and regime
B is where the government increases the productive spending on education
only. Hence regime B implies that the long-run composition of government
spending changes in favor of productive spending. Subplots (1,3) and (3,3)
show ξ, which measures the welfare gains in terms of the percent of the con-
sumption stream associated with policy B relative to A, for a range of values
for public education spending as a share of output, e ge (see the Appendix for
the derivation of ξ). Subplot (1,3) plots ξ for the (1 − θ1)=0 .05 case while
subplot (2,3) is for (1 − θ1)=0 .4.
4.1.1 Moderate externalities (as in Lucas, 1988)
The Laﬀer curve in subplot (1,1) suggests that, for policy regime A, the
positive growth eﬀects outweigh the disincentives of income taxation for in-
creases in the public education share up to around 15% and imply a maximum
growth rate of about 1.026%. Relative to the steady-state in the base cali-
bration of the model (i.e. e ge =5 .5% and γ =1 .02%) these imply changes of
approximately 9.5 and about 0.01 percentage points respectively.
For policy regime B (see subplot (1,2)) the growth maximizing public
education share is around 47% of GDP and the associated growth rate is
1.036%, which imply changes of approximately 41.5 and 1.6 percentage points
respectively. It is therefore immediately evident that there is much more
scope for government intervention in the economy, if it takes the form of
solely growth enhancing activities.
While the growth Laﬀer curves shows there is scope for growth promoting
government spending, the welfare subplots (2,1) and (2,2) suggest that the
welfare maximizing e ge share is less than the growth maximizing share. Under
16policy regime A (subplot (2,1)), the welfare maximizing e ge share is around
6.5%, while, under policy regime B (subplot (2,2)), the welfare maximizing e ge
share is around 8.5%. The reason that the welfare Laﬀer curves peak earlier
than the respective growth Laﬀer curves is that growth in this context has
compositional eﬀects on the economy. For example, while the increasing gov-
e r n m e n ts i z ec a ne n h a n c eg r o w t hb ya l l o c a t i n gm o r es o c i a lr e s o u r c e st o w a r d s
education, the associated higher tax rate decreases the post-tax labour and
capital income and thus private consumption as a share of human capital, c,
is crowded-out (see also below, Figure 2).
Finally, subplot (2,6) suggests that there are important welfare gains from
moving to policy regime B, at least for e ge shares larger than 6.5% (which is
the welfare maximizing e geshare under regime A). At the welfare maximizing
e geshare under regime B (i.e. around 8.5%), the welfare gains are as high as
4% of consumption.
4.1.2 Low externalities (as in Tamura, 1991)
The results reported in Figure 1 also suggest that the scope for government
intervention is smaller if the human capital externality is lower (refer to the
r e dl i n ew i t ha+m a r k e ri ne a c hs u b p l o t ) .I np a r t i c u l a r ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
(1−θ1)=0 .05, the growth maximizing e ge share is again at the same level as
for the moderate externalities case. Also note that the growth rate is higher
under lower externalities, for every level of government education spending,
under both policy regimes. This is expected, as, under lower externalities,
individual agents internalize more of the eﬀects of their education eﬀort on
human capital. As we shall see below in Figure 2, the gap between the
private and social returns is higher when externalities are higher, so that
when externalities are higher, private education time is lower and hence the
growth rate is lower.
However, as subplots (2,1) and (2,2) show, under lower externalities, the
welfare curves peak earlier, so that, under both regimes, the welfare maxi-
mizing e geshare is about 3.5%, which is within the range of historical data,
but lower than the average historical level of public education spending.20
Hence, the lower the externalities, the less scope there is for welfare en-
hancing government involvement in education. Subplot (1,3) again indicates
that increases in e geshare under regime B again welfare dominate respective
increases under regime A.
20We have conducted a sensitivity analysis of the level welfare maximizing e ge share with
respect to the degree of externalities, and found that under regime A externalities of about
25% are necessary to justify a e ge share of 5.5% (the historical data average) as welfare
maximizing. Under regime B, respective externalities need to be approximately 15%.
174.1.3 Policy, externalities and other stationary variables
To further evaluate the importance of externalities for the eﬀects of policy
on the economy, we ﬁnally examine the long-run eﬀects of increases in the
e ge share on the other stationary variables of the model. These are shown in
Figure 2 for both policy regimes. There are, again, two graphs per subplot
for (1 − θ1)=0 .4 (solid blue line) and 0.05 (red line with a + marker)
respectively, except for the the graphs for the tax rate, which is common
under both cases. The ﬁrst two rows of subplots in Figure 2 refers to regime
A, while the other two refer to regime B. As can be seen, the eﬀects are
similar under both regimes.
Subplots (1,1) and (3,1) show that when externalities are higher, educa-
tion eﬀort e is lower, reﬂecting that agents can eﬀectively free ride on the
human capital good. In other words, the more an individual agent’s human
capital depends on aggregate outcomes, the less private eﬀo r tw i l lb ei n -
vested in education since the aggregate public good acts as a substitute for
the private one.
The marginal values of consumption, λ (subplots (2,1) and (4,1)) and
of education, ψ (subplots (2,2) and (4,2)) are lower in the steady-state in
the presence of higher externalities. This is explained by the fact that when
externalities are higher, the marginal private returns to investment are lower,
as agents fail to internalize the increase in the marginal product of human and
physical capital through the aggregate human capital term. In other words,
the gap between the private and social returns is higher when externalities
are higher.
Higher externalities also imply that y (subplots (1,3) and (3,3)) and c
(subplots (1,2) and (3,2)) are higher. This follows since under higher ex-
ternalities, the level of human capital can be increased with less education
eﬀort. Therefore, households choose to spend more time on work (see sub-
plots (2,1) and (4,1)) which in turn leads to higher output, labour income
and consumption. Finally, note that the tax rate associated with maximum
welfare under regime A is around 25%, while under regime B it is around
24%.
The results of the various exercises above suggest that increases in gov-
ernment size due to a rise in the share of productive expenditure produce
plausible quantitative general equilibrium outcomes. In particular, the ﬁnd-
ings for both regimes regarding the Laﬀer curves appear consistent with other
quantitative evidence, which ﬁnds positive growth eﬀects of productive gov-
ernment spending in diﬀerent cross-country and panel samples (see e.g. the
papers by Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller
et al. (1999)).
18Figure 2: Steady-state effects of public education spending for high and low externalities
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Regime B4.2 Transitional dynamics
Given that subsection 4.1 documents the steady-state eﬀects of permanent
increases in the public spending shares, we next turn to the dynamic proper-
ties of the model. To accurately gauge the persistence of the public spending
shocks, we estimate the AR(1) relation given by (22) using US NIPA data,
where the log deviations are deﬁned relative to a Hodrick-Prescott trend.
The estimated values for ρe is 0.442 and is signiﬁcant at less than the 1%
level of signiﬁcance. The standard deviation of this process is 0.019.U s i n g
a production function and time period similar to ours, Lansing (1988) pro-
vides estimates for TFP. Hence we use his parameters for the stationary TFP
process in (23),e . g . ρ =0 .933 and σa =0 .01. Given that we have solved
for a second order approximation of the model, we compute the impulse re-
sponses using the second order solution to the model (see the Appendix for
details of the calculations involved).
4.2.1 Education spending shock
In Figure 3a, we start our analysis by examining the response to a standard
deviation shock to e ge
t innovations (see eq. 22) for policy regime A.21 The
last row of Figure 3a shows that this shock implies an increase in education




t deﬁn e di ne q s .(19)−(22)). As said above, this reﬂects
the complementarities in the provision of public services. For example, if the
government wishes to increase the number of teachers in the education sector,
this will imply an increase in public administration support personnel. Or, if
the government builds new schools, it will have to provide the corresponding
infrastructure such as new roads and bridges to connect the new schools with
the rest of the community.
T h em o s ti m p o r t a n tt h i n gt on o t ei nF i g u r e2i st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei n
ge
t (subplot (1,1)) generates a non-monotonic reaction in the growth rate,
γt (subplot (2,1)). Initially, the positive eﬀects of increased human capital
productivity outweighs the disincentives of higher taxation, τt (subplot (4,3))
so that education time, et (subplot (1,3)) and hence γt increase. However,
21We have also examined the impulse responses to a standard deviation shock to e ge
t
innovations for policy regime B. The main qualitative results are the same as above,
although, quantitatively, the eﬀects of this shock on the economy are smaller. Under
policy regime A, as expected, government spending education shocks have a much bigger
eﬀect on the overall size of the government and thus on the economy. This follows since
increases in public education spending bring about complementary increases in the other
components of government spending. To preserve space, we don’t report these results but
t h e ya r ea v a i l a b l eo nr e q u e s t .
19Figure 3a: Impulse responses to public education innovations



















































































































































































Yearsafter the initial boom the negative eﬀects dominate, thus the growth rate
becomes lower than its steady-state value after four years and the economy
converges to the steady-state from below.
Since ge
t enters the human capital production function directly (see eq.
5), human capital increases by more than output, consumption and private
capital, so that these variables as shares of human capital, i.e. yt, ct, k
p
t in
subplots (2,1), (3,1), (2,2), fall. In contrast, public capital (subplot (2,3)) in-
creases as a share of human capital. This arises since government infrastruc-
ture investment, gi
t is proportional to ge
t (see last row of Figure 2) and gi
t in
turn has a direct eﬀect on public capital accumulation.
We ﬁnally examine the post-tax wage, wt, subplot (3,3) and interest rate,
rt, subplot (3,2) after the education spending shock. For example, wt de-
creases, as the tax increase eliminates the beneﬁts from the increase in pro-
ductivity, so that the returns to the eﬀective labour input fall. This also
helps to understand the increase in education time, et, as households substi-
tute work time for education, since the return to the latter is now higher.
Further note that the reaction of the post tax return to capital is initially
the same as the return to labour. However, it subsequently increases (as yt
is increasing faster than k
p
t, see eq. 15) so that the post-tax interest rate
converges to its steady-state value from above. This dynamic adjustment
path can be understood by recognizing that there are there are two opposing
eﬀects on the post-tax return to capital, rt. These include the negative eﬀect
resulting from the increased tax rate and the positive one from the increase
in human capital. Given that human and physical capital are complements
in the goods production (see eq. 12), increases in the former lead to increases
in the latter. Thus it appears that the negative tax eﬀect on rt dominates the
positive human capital eﬀect initially, but after 3-4 periods this is reversed.
4.2.2 TFP shock
In Figure 3b, we ﬁnally examine the responses of the key endogenous variables
to a standard deviation shock to TFP innovations (see, eq. 23). This will help
to contextualize the qualitative and quantitative importance of the education
spending shock.22 The ﬁrst thing to note is that, in the absence of the trade-
oﬀ associated with discretionary government education spending discussed
above, the responses after the TFP shock are positive for the growth rate,
output, consumption and private capital. The second important observation
22Note that the responses to TFP shocks are essentially the same under the two policy
regimes. Again, to save space, these results are not reported here but will be made available
on request.
20Figure 3b: Impulse responses to TFP innovations

















































































































































































Yearsis that the quantitative magnitudes of the reactions are comparable for the
standard deviation TFP and education spending shocks.
By deﬁnition, a positive TFP shock increases the productivity of both
eﬀective labour (see w in subplot (3,3) and physical capital (see r in subplot
(3,2)). Given the increase in r, investment in physical capital increases, as
reﬂected by the increase in kp (subplot (2,3)). However, as yt is decreasing
faster than k
p
t, r (see eq. 15) falls below its steady-state value and converges
to this from below. Regarding w, its initial eﬀect is to decrease education
time, e (subplot (1,3)), as households want to work more to receive the higher
wage, but the increased return to human capital implies that they also want
to educate more, so that after the initial drop, e is increased and this helps
to sustain the increase in the growth rate for about 15 years.
Since, via the production function for goods (see eq. 12), the eﬀect of
TFP on physical goods production is direct, output increases by more than
human capital, so that y (subplot (2,1)) increases. As consumption (subplot
(3,1)) is a normal good, it follows income by increasing, although by a smaller
amount. This is the standard consumption smoothing result.
In this exercise, the tax rate, τt (subplot (3,3)) has not increased, but
as income increases, tax revenue increase, so that government spending as a
share of human capital is higher after the TFP shock (see last row of Figure
3). This also implies that public capital as a share of human capital increases.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the importance of public education spending,
under human capital externalities, for aggregate outcomes. In particular,
we found that public spending on education is generally growth and welfare
promoting and have documented the magnitudes for the size of human capital
externalities over which this occurs.
The results of our base calibration (Regime A), under moderate sized
externalities, suggest that the growth rate of the economy over our sample
would have been higher by about 0.01 of a point if the education spending
share of output was 15% instead of its historical average of 5.5%. However,
given that pubic education spending crowds-out private consumption, the
welfare maximising size of the government is found to be 6.5%. Thus, it
appears that these is some scope for increasing welfare gains by raising public
education’s share in output.
We next found that there are potentially further welfare gains to be made
if the composition of public spending can be altered in favour of education
spending relative to the other components of total government spending (i.e.
21Regime B). These welfare increases, calculated using the solution to the sec-
ond order approximation of the model, amount to 4 percent of consumption
and correspond to an education spending share of 8.5%.
Another main ﬁnding is that the positive welfare eﬀects of education
spending work through human capital externalities. In particular, in the
presence of higher externalities, the model predicts that the welfare max-
imizing education spending is higher. Since there is a larger gap between
private and social returns under higher externalities, government interven-
tion is more beneﬁcial.
Finally, we found that a positive education spending shock generates a
non-monotonic reaction in the growth rate and other key economic variables,
so that after an initial boom there is a decrease in the growth rate below
its steady-state value. The quantitative eﬀects of discretionary ﬁscal policy
of this form were found to be quite important, since they were similar in
magnitude to those of a standard TFP shock.
Thus the general message arising from this study is that public educa-
tion spending policy is indeed quantitatively important for macroeconomic
outcomes and that human capital externalities are signiﬁcant in determining
these. Therefore, more research is needed to assess the empirically relevant
magnitude of human capital externalities and to further evaluate the diﬀerent
possible channels through which these shape the eﬀects of education policies
in modern economies.
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266A p p e n d i c e s
6.1 Steady-state of DCE
In the absence of stochastic shocks to At and ge
t for all t, the economy con-
verges to its steady-state in which the stationary variables deﬁn e di ns u b -
section 2.4 are constant (i.e. for any xt, x denotes its long-run value). Since
our model’s steady-state does not have an analytic solution, its numeric so-
lution implied by the parameters values in Table 1 is reported in Appendix
Table 1. With the exception of the steady-state growth rate, γ, and the share
of time allocated to education, e, all endogenous variables are reported as
shares of both Ht and Y t. Given that the normalization with respect to Ht
is less familiar to most readers, the shares with respect to Y t are included to
help contextualize the results relative to others reported in the literature.
Appendix Table 1: Steady-state
variable Shares of Ht variable Shares of Y t
γ 1.02 n.a. n.a.
















Further note that our calibration does not produce a multiplicity of solu-
tions. This ﬁnding is documented in Appendix Figure 1 below which shows
the sensitivity of the steady-state growth rate to a range of values for every
parameter in the model. These ranges cover the values found in the relevant
calibration and estimation literatures. As expected, the elasticity of output
growth with respect to the scale parameters A, B and θ2 is the greatest,
otherwise the output growth response works in the expected direction and is
not overly sensitive to any parameter in the model.
27Appendix Figure 1: Partial effects of changes in the parameters on 
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(1-θ1)7W e l f a r e
7.1 Within-period utility function
Using the notation set out in the paper, ﬁrst consider the per capita repre-


















, is stationary consumption and Ht is the beginning-of-
period capital stock. From the deﬁnition of the growth rate, γt ≡ Ht+1/Ht








where H0 is given from initial conditions.
















for t =0 .( A4.b)
7.2 Utility at the steady-state
We next deﬁne the long-run as the state without stochastic shocks which
implies that stationary variables are constant. Thus using (A4.a,b), utility








where the * superscript denotes steady-state per capita utility. In the steady-
state, non-stationary Ct grows at the constant rate γ, which in turn implies
for σ,γ > 1 that the growth of U
∗
t is constant and less than unity.
287.3 Approximate within-period utility
7.3.1 Time t ≥ 1





































0 + b γ
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b γ0b γ1 + b γ0b γ2 + ... + b γ0b γt−1
¢
+( b γ1b γ2 + b γ1b γ2 + ... +





where for any variable xt, b xt ≡ ln(xt/x); xt−x
x ' b xt+ 1
2 (b xt)
2;t h es superscript
denotes the 2nd-order approximation to utility; O[3] contains all terms of
order higher than two; and the 1st- and 2nd-partial derivatives of (A4.a)
evaluated at the steady-state. In what follows, consistent with the literature,
we set O[3] = 0.
We start by ﬁnding, for any t ≥ 1, the second-order approximation of












(1 − σ)b c
2
t].( A6.1)






















































Combining (A6.1), (A6.2), (A6.3) and (A6.4) we can thus write the
second-order approximation of (A4.a) using the general form provided by



























(1 − σ)b ct
t−1 X
s=0










7.3.2 Time t =0









































7.4 Second-order approximation of expected lifetime
utility
Lifetime welfare, V ,i sd e ﬁned as the present discounted value of lifetime





























































s +( 1− σ)b ct
t−1 X
s=0










In the simulations T =3 0 0and the sample average for V is calculated
using 500 simulations.23
23Note that for our annual rate of time preference, β =0 .964, VT ' 0 for T =3 0 0 .I n




t denote the contingent plan for per capita consumption associated
with regime A and C
B
t the contingent plan for per capita consumption asso-
ciated with regime B. We can then, following e.g. Lucas (1990), deﬁne ξ as
the fraction of regime B’s consumption process that a household would be






























































=( 1 − ξ)
1−σV(B).( A9)
Solving for ξ we then obtain:
V(A) =( 1 − ξ)
1−σV(B)

















where, V(B) and V(A) are calculated using the second order approximation of
welfare deﬁned in (A80) averaged over 500 simulations.
7.5 Computation of second-order impulse response func-
tions




Et[yt+p |σi;I0|] − E[yt+p |I0|]
E[yt+p |I0|]
(A11)
where y denotes our vector of endogenous state and co-state variables; σi
represents the standard deviation of the ith innovation, εi; i =1 ,2 refers
31to εe and εa respectively; and I0 is the information set available at time 0.
To compute the conditional expectation, Et, we use Monte-Carlo integration
consisting of S =5 0 0simulations over a time horizon of P =4 0for the public
spending shock and 80 for the productivity shock. The simple algorithm we
employ is as follows:
1. For an initial value of the exogenous state xi, xi
0,w h e r ei =1 ,2 refers to
ge and A respectively and the initial value refers to the steady-state, we
draw S replications of a vector of innovations for xi






2. Using the second-order solution to the model, we then compute S re-
alizations of yp, denoted ys
p(xi
0,εi,s) for p =0 ,...,P and s =1 ,...,S.
3. We repeat (2) using the same draws from (1) except we shock εi
0 by σi.
The shocked realizations from the second-order solution are denoted
ys
p(xi
0,σi,εi,s) for p =0 ,...,P and s =1 ,...,S.











for p =0 ,...,P.










for each p =0 ,...,P.
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